What was worcester v georgia

A group of white missionaries, which included Samuel Worcester, were doing missionary work in Cherokee territory in the State of Georgia. The group was not only doing religious missionary work but was also giving the Cherokee advice on how to resist Georgia state laws. The Cherokee were a self-governing people who had autonomy and rights to land through agreements with the United States government.

Worcester and others never obtained the license or gave an oath. Georgia then arrested Worcester and the other missionaries.

Can the State of Georgia regulate by state law the interaction between citizens of the state and members of the Cherokee nation? All laws of the State of Georgia regarding the Cherokee nation were unconstitutional and, therefore, void. The Court ordered Worcester freed. Indian territories, such as the Cherokee nation, are separate from the states, and the intercourse between the Indian territories and the states shall be conducted exclusively by the United States government.

The Cherokee nation is a community distinct from the State of Georgia. US Census Bureau. Chapter 3: Labor, Servitude and Slavery. Chapter War with Mexico. Tallmadge in the Congressional Globe February 15, Speech to Congress February 15, Letter to John Holmes April 22, The Webster-Hayne Debates January, To The Public January 01, Truisms January 08, Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality: The October, Lecture Delivered at Franklin Hall September 21, On the Constitution and the Union December 29, December 06, Appeal to the Christian Women of the South Appeal to Christian Women of the South Slavery a Positive Good February 06, Speech on Abolition Petitions February 06, Protest in Illinois Legislature on Slavery March 03, First Inaugural Address March 04, Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condi Lyceum Address January 27, June 16, Declaration of Sentiments Adopted by the Peace Con September 28, State of the Union Address December 05, Address to the Slaves of the United States June 02, Letter to Richard Pakenham, British Minister to th April 18, The American Union January 10, Annexation July, Letter to Williamson Durley October 03, Wilmot Proviso August 12, Speech on the Mexican War December 16, American Slavery October 22, January 12, Speech on the Oregon Bill June 27, July 14, September 29, Annual Message to Congress December 5, The Address of Southern Delegates in Congress to t February 09, June 08, Uses and Abuses of the Bible November 04, Civil Disobedience Compromise of January 29, Compromise of State of the Union Address December 02, Colored people of Boston What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?

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Speed August 24, The Last Flogging State of the Union Address December 31, Democratic Party Platforms June 18, Dred Scott v. Sandford March 06, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision May, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision June 26, Reply to the Dred Scott Decision June 26, State of the Union Address December 08, Cotton is King March 04, Mud Sill Speech March 04, Dred Scott and Disunion March 12, House Divided Speech June 16, Homecoming Speech at Chicago July 09, Speech at Chicago, Illinois July 10, Speech at Springfield, Illinois July 17, Speech in Reply to Douglas at Springfield, Illinoi July 17, Fragment on Slavery August 1, Letter to J.

Brown October 18, Fragment on Slavery December 1, State of the Union Address December 06, African Civilization Society February, Address before the Wisconsin State Agricultural So September 30, Correspondence October, John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance December 16, State of the Union Address December 19, Republican Party Platform May 17, Republican Party Platform of May, Democratic Party Platform of June 18, Southern Desperation December 16, December 24, Distribution of the Slave Population by State Fragment on the Constitution and Union January, Inaugural Address February 18, Defense of Lincoln May 20, The Folly of Colonization January 09, Social Change and Reform.

Chapter The Nullification Crisis. Temperance Address February 22, Inaugural Address March 04, December, July 10, A Plea for the West The Laboring Classes Record of the Organization and Proceedings of The Massachusetts Lawmakers Investigate Working Condit Declaration of Sentiments July 19, Time Table for Lowell Mills Marriage Protest May 02, And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that each person who may belong to said guard, shall receiver for his compensation at the rate of fifteen dollars per month when on foot, and at the rate of twenty dollars per month when mounted, for every month that such person is engaged in actual service; and, in the event, that the commissioner or agent, herein referred to, should die, resign, or fail to perform the duties herein required of him, his Excellency the Governor is hereby authorised and required to appoint, in his stead, some other fit and proper person to the command of said guard; and the commissioner or agent, having the command of the guard aforesaid, for the better discipline thereof, shall appoint three sergeants, who shall receive at the rate of twenty dollars per month while serving on foot, and twenty-five dollars per month, when mounted, as compensation whilst in actual service.

And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid that the said guard, or any member of them, shall be, and they are hereby, authorised and empowered to arrest any person legally charged with, or detected in, a violation of the laws of this State, and to convey, as soon as practicable, the person so arrested before a justice of the peace, judge of the superior or justice of inferior court of this State, to be dealt.

Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Georgia in general assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, that, from and after the passing of this Act, all that part of the unlocated territory within the limits of this State, and which lies between the Alabama line and the old path leading from the Buzzard Roost on the Chattahoochee, to Sally Hughes', on the Hightower River; thence to Thomas Pelet's on the old federal road; thence with said road to the Alabama line be, and the same is hereby added to, and shall become a part of, the County of Carroll.

And be it further enacted that all that part of said territory lying and being north of the last mentioned line and south of the road running from Charles Gait's ferry, on the Chattahoochee River, to Dick Roe's, to where it intersects with the path aforesaid, be, and the same is hereby added to, and shall become a part of, the County of De Kalb.

And be it further enacted,that all that part of the said territory lying north of the last mentioned line and south of a line commencing at the mouth of Baldridge's Creek; thence up said creek to its source; from thence to where the federal road crosses the Hightower; thence with said road to the Tennessee line, be, and the same is hereby added to, and shall become part of, the County of Gwinnett.

And be it further enacted that all that part of the said territory lying north of said last mentioned line and south. And be it further enacted that all that part of said territory lying north of said last mentioned line, within the limits of this State, be, and the same is hereby added to, and shall become a part of, the County of Habersham. And be it further enacted, that all the laws, both civil and criminal, of this State, be, and the same are hereby, extended over said portions of territory, respectively; and all persons whatever, residing within the same, shall, after the 1st day of June next, be subject and liable to the operation of said laws in the same manner as other citizens of this State, or the citizens of said counties, respectively, and all writs and processes whatever, issued by the courts or officers of said courts, shall extend over, and operate on, the portions of territory hereby added to the same, respectively.

And be it further enacted that, after the 1st day of June next, all laws, ordinances, orders and regulations, of any kind whatever, made, passed or enacted, by the Cherokee Indians, either in general council or in any other way whatever, or by any authority whatever of said tribe, be, and the same are hereby declared to be, null and void, and of no effect, as if the same had never existed, and, in all cases of indictment or civil suits, it shall not be lawful for the defendant to justify under any of said laws, ordinances, orders or regulations; nor shall the courts of this State permit the same to be given in evidence on the trial of any suit whatever.

And be it further enacted that it shall not be lawful for any person or body of persons, by arbitrary power or by virtue of any pretended rule, ordinance, law or custom of said Cherokee Nation, to prevent by threats, menaces or other means, or endeavour to prevent, any Indian of said Nation residing within the chartered limits of this State, from enrolling as an emigrant, or actually emigrating or removing from said nation; nor shall it be lawful for any person or body of persons, by arbitrary power or by virtue of any pretended rule,.

And be it further enacted that any person or body of persons offending against the provisions of the foregoing section shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour, subject to indictment, and on conviction shall be punished by confinement in the common jail of any county of this State, or by confinement at hard labour in the penitentiary, for a term not exceeding four years, at the discretion of the court. And be it further enacted that it shall not be lawful for any person or body of persons, by arbitrary power, or under colour of any pretended rule, ordinance, law or custom of said nation, to prevent or offer to prevent, or deter any Indian headman, chief or warrior of said nation, residing within the chartered limits of this State, from selling or ceding to the United States, for the use of Georgia, the whole or any part of said territory, or to prevent or offer to prevent, any Indian, headman, chief or warrior of said nation, residing as aforesaid, from meeting in council or treaty any commissioner or commissioners on the part of the United States, for any purpose whatever.

And be it further enacted, that any person or body of persons offending against the provisions of the foregoing sections, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour, subject to indictment, and on conviction shall be confined at hard labour in the penitentiary for not less than four nor longer than six years, at the discretion of the court.

And be it further enacted, that it shall not be lawful for any person or body of persons, by arbitrary force, or under colour of any pretended rules, ordinances, law or custom of said nation, to take the life of any Indian residing as aforesaid, for enlisting as an emigrant, attempting to emigrate, ceding, or attempting to cede, as aforesaid, the whole or any part of the said territory, or meeting or attempting to meet, in treaty or in council, as aforesaid, any commissioner or commissioners aforesaid; and any person or body of persons offending against the provisions of this section shall be guilty of.

And be it further enacted that, should any of the foregoing offences be committed under colour of any pretended rules, ordinances, custom or law of said nation, all persons acting therein, either as individuals or as pretended executive, ministerial or judicial officers, shall be deemed and considered as principals, and subject to the pains and penalties hereinbefore described.

And be it further enacted that for all demands which may come within the jurisdiction of a magistrate's court, suit may be brought for the same in the nearest district of the county to which the territory is hereby annexed, and all officers serving any legal process on any person living on any portion of the territory herein named shall be entitled to recover the sum of five cents for every mile he may ride to serve the same, after crossing the present limits of the said counties, in addition to the fees already allowed by law; and in case any of the said officers should be resisted in the execution of any legal process issued by any court or magistrate, justice of the inferior court, or judge of the superior court of any of said counties, he is hereby authorised to call out a sufficient number of the militia of said counties to aid and protect him in the execution of this duty.

And be it further enacted that no Indian or descendant of any Indian residing within the Creek or Cherokee Nations of Indians shall be deemed a competent witness in any court of this State to which a white person may be a party, except such white person resides within the said nation. In September , the grand jurors for the county of Gwinnett in the State of Georgia, presented to the superior court of the county the following indictment:.

Losure, white persons of said county, with the offence of 'residing within the limits of the Cherokee Nation without a license:' For that the said Elizur Butler, Samuel A. Losure, white persons, as aforesaid, on the 15th day of July , did reside in that part of the Cherokee Nation attached by the laws of said State to the said county, and in the county aforesaid, without a license or permit from his Excellency the Governor of said State, or from any agent authorised by his Excellency the Governor aforesaid to grant such permit or license, and without having taken the oath to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the State of Georgia, and uprightly to demean themselves as citizens thereof, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.

Worcester, in his own proper person, comes and says that this Court ought not to take further cognizance of the action and prosecution aforesaid, because, he says, that on the 15th day of July in the year , he was, and still is, a resident in the Cherokee Nation, and that the said supposed crime, or crimes, and each of them, were committed, if committee at all, at the town of New Echota, in the said Cherokee Nation, out of the jurisdiction of this Court, and not in the county Gwinnett, or elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this Court.

By these treaties, and particularly by the treaties of Hopewell and Holston, the aforesaid territory is acknowledged to lie without the jurisdiction of the several states composing the Union of the United States; and, it is thereby specially stipulated that the citizens of the United States shall not enter the aforesaid territory, even on a visit, without a passport from the Governor of a State, or from some one duly authorised thereto by the President of the United States, all of which will more fully and at large appear by reference to the aforesaid treaties.

And this defendant saith that the several acts charged in the bill of indictment were done or omitted to be done, if at all, within the said territory so recognized as belonging to the said Nation, and so, as aforesaid, held by them, under the guarantee of the United States; that for those acts the defendant is not amenable to the laws of Georgia, nor to the jurisdiction of the courts of the said State; and that the laws of the State of Georgia, which profess to add the said territory to the several adjacent counties of the said State, and to extend the laws of Georgia over the said territory.

This plea was overruled by the court; and the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of the County of Gwinnett was sustained by the judgment of the court. The defendant was then arraigned, and pleaded "not guilty," and the case came on for trial on the 15th of September , when the jury found the defendants in the indictment guilty. On the same day the court pronounced sentence on the parties so convicted, as follows:.

Thompson and others. Indictment for residing in the Cherokee Nation without license. Verdict, Guilty. Elizur Butler, Samuel A. Worcester and others. A writ of error was issued on the application of the plaintiff in error, on the 27th of October , which, with the following proceedings thereon, was returned to this court.

Worcester, defendant, on an indictment, being the highest court of law in said State in which a decision could be had in said suit, a manifest error hath happened, to the great damage of the said Samuel A. Worcester, as by his complaint appears.

We being willing that error, if any hath been, should be duly corrected, and full and speedy justice done to the parties aforesaid in this behalf, do command you, if judgment be therein given that then under your seal distinctly and openly, you send the record and proceedings aforesaid, with all things concerning the same, to the Supreme Court of the United States, together with this writ, so that you have the same at Washington on the second Monday of January next, in the said Supreme Court, to be then and there held; that the record and proceedings aforesaid being inspected, the said Supreme Court may cause further to be done therein, to correct that error, what of right, and according to the laws and custom of the United States, should be done.

Worcester is plaintiff in error, and the State of Georgia is defendant in error, to show cause, if any there be, why judgment rendered against the said Samuel A.

Worcester, as in the said writ of error mentioned, should not be corrected, and why speedy justice should not be done to the parties in that behalf. Jenkins, Esq. Attorney General of the State aforesaid, showing to the said Governor and Attorney General, respectively, at the times of delivery herein stated, the within citation.

I, John G. Park, clerk of the Superior Court of the County of Gwinnett and State aforesaid, do certify that the annexed and foregoing is a full and complete exemplification of the proceedings and judgments had in said court against Samuel A.

Worcester, one of the defendants in the case therein mentioned as they remain of record in the said Superior Court. The case of Elizur Butler, Plaintiff in Error v.

The State of Georgia, was brought before the Supreme Court in the same manner. The defendant is a State, a member of the Union, which has exercised the powers of government over a people who deny its jurisdiction, and are under the protection of the United States.

The plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Vermont, condemned to hard labour for four years in the penitentiary of Georgia under colour of an act which he alleges to be repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The legislative power of a State, the controlling power of the Constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have any, the political existence of a once numerous and powerful people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.

It behooves this court, in every case, more especially in this, to examine into its jurisdiction with scrutinizing eyes before it proceeds to the exercise of a power which is controverted.

The first step in the performance of this duty is the inquiry whether the record is properly before the Court. It is certified by the clerk of the court which pronounced the judgment of condemnation under which the plaintiff in error is imprisoned, and is also authenticated by the seal of the court.

It is returned with, and annexed to, a writ of error issued in regular form, the citation being signed by one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and served on the Governor and Attorney General of the State more than thirty days before the commencement of the term to which the writ of error was returnable. The Judicial Act sec. In the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee , 1 Wheat. In Buel v. Van Ness , 8 Wheat. No exception was taken to it.

These were civil cases. But it has been truly said at the bar that, in regard to this process, the law makes no distinction between a criminal and civil case. The same return is required in both. If the sanction of the Court could be necessary for the establishment of this position, it has been silently given. M'Culloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. Brown et al. The State of Maryland was an indictment for a fine and forfeiture.

The record in this case, too, was authenticated by the seal of the Court and the certificate of the clerk. The practice is both ways. The record, then, according to the Judiciary Act and the rule and the practice of the Court, is regularly before us.

The more important inquiry is does it exhibit a case cognizable by this tribunal? The indictment charges the plaintiff in error and others, being white persons, with the offence of "residing within the limits of the Cherokee Nation without a license," and "without having taken the oath to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the State of Georgia.

Worcester, in his own proper person, comes and says that this Court ought not to take. By these treaties, and particularly by the Treaties of Hopewell and Holston, the aforesaid territory is acknowledged to lie without the jurisdiction of the several states composing the Union of the United States, and it is thereby specially stipulated that the citizens of the United States shall not enter the aforesaid territory, even on a visit, without a passport from the Governor of a State, or from someone duly authorised thereto by the President of the United States, all of which will more fully and at large appear by reference to the aforesaid treaties.

And this defendant saith that the several acts charged in the bill of indictment were done or omitted to be done, if at all, within the said territory so recognized as belonging to the said nation and so, as aforesaid, held by them under the guarantee of the United States; that, for those acts, the defendant is not amenable to the laws of Georgia, nor to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the said state, and that the laws of the State of Georgia, which profess to add the said territory to the several adjacent counties of the said State and to extend the laws of Georgia over the said territory and persons inhabiting the same, and, in particular, the act on which this indictment against this defendant is grounded, to-wit,".

This plea was overruled by the Court. And the prisoner, being arraigned, plead not guilty. The jury found a verdict against him, and the Court sentenced him to hard labour in the penitentiary for the term of four years. By overruling this plea, the Court decided that the matter it contained was not a bar to the action. The plea, therefore, must be examined for the purpose of determining whether it makes a case which brings the party within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the "Act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States.

The plea avers that the residence, charged in the indictment, was under the authority of the President of the United States, and with the permission and approval of the Cherokee Nation. That the treaties, subsisting between the United States, and the Cherokees, acknowledge their right as a sovereign nation to govern themselves and all persons who have settled within their territory, free from any right of legislative interference by the several states composing the United States of America.

That the act under which the prosecution was instituted is repugnant to the said treaties, and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. That the said act is also unconstitutional because it interferes with and attempts to regulate and control the intercourse with the Cherokee Nation, which belongs exclusively to Congress, and because also it is repugnant to the statute of the United States, entitled "An act to. That section enumerates the cases in which the final judgment or decree of a State court may be revised in the Supreme Court of the United States.

These are. The indictment and plea in this case draw in question, we think, the validity of the treaties made by the United States with the Cherokee Indians; if not so, their construction is certainly drawn in question; and the decision has been, if not against their validity, "against the right, privilege or exemption, specially set up and claimed under them.

It is, then, we think, too clear for controversy that the act of Congress by which this Court is constituted has given it the power, and of course imposed on it the duty, of exercising jurisdiction in this case. This duty, however unpleasant, cannot be avoided.

Those who fill the judicial department have no discretion in selecting the subjects to be brought before them. We must examine the defence set up in this plea. We must inquire and decide whether the act of the Legislature of Georgia under which the plaintiff in error has been prosecuted and condemned be consistent with, or repugnant to, the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.

It has been said at the bar that the acts of the Legislature of Georgia seize on the whole Cherokee country, parcel it out among the neighbouring counties of the State, extend her code over the whole country, abolish its institutions and its laws, and annihilate its political existence. If this be the general effect of the system, let us inquire into the effect of the particular statute and section on which the indictment is founded.

The extraterritorial power of every legislature being limited in its action to its own citizens or subjects, the very passage of this act is an assertion of jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation, and of the rights and powers consequent on jurisdiction. The first step, then, in the inquiry which the Constitution and laws impose on this Court is an examination of the rightfulness of this claim. America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their.

It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied, or that the discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the preexisting rights of its ancient possessors. After lying concealed for a series of ages, the enterprise of Europe, guided by nautical science, conducted some of her adventurous sons into this western world.

They found it in possession of a people who had made small progress in agriculture or manufactures, and whose general employment was war, hunting, and fishing. Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they were commissioned, a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or rightful dominion over the numerous people who occupied it?

Or has nature, or the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and manufacturers? But power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world, and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend.

We proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having glanced at their origin, because holding it in our recollection might shed some light on existing pretensions. The great maritime powers of Europe discovered and visited different parts of this continent at nearly the same time.

The object was too immense for any one of them to grasp the whole, and the claimants were too powerful to submit to the exclusive or unreasonable pretensions of any single potentate. To avoid bloody conflicts which might terminate disastrously to all, it was necessary for the nations of Europe to establish some principle which all would acknowledge, and which should decide their respective rights as between themselves.

This principle, suggested by the actual state of things, was. This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans because it was the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed to it, not one which could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it.

The relation between the Europeans and the natives was determined in each case by the particular government which asserted and could maintain this preemptive privilege in the particular place. The United States succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and political, but no attempt, so far as is known, has been made to enlarge them. They purport, generally, to convey the soil from the Atlantic to the South Sea. This soil was occupied by numerous and warlike nations, equally willing and able to defend their possessions.

The extravagant and absurd idea that the feeble settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from. The Crown could not be understood to grant what the Crown did not affect to claim; nor was it so understood. The power of making war is conferred by these charters on the colonies, but defensive war alone seems to have been contemplated.

In the first charter to the first and second colonies, they are empowered, "for their several defences, to encounter, expulse, repel, and resist, all persons who shall, without license," attempt to inhabit. The charter to Connecticut concludes a general power to make defensive war with these terms: "and upon just causes to invade and destroy the natives or other enemies of the said colony. This power to repel invasion, and, upon just cause, to invade and destroy the natives, authorizes offensive as well as defensive war, but only "on just cause.

These barbarous nations whose incursions were feared, and to repel whose incursions the power to make war was given, were surely not considered as the subjects of Penn, or occupying his lands during his pleasure. The charter to Georgia professes to be granted for the charitable purpose of enabling poor subjects to gain a comfortable subsistence by cultivating lands in the American provinces "at present waste and desolate. These motives for planting the new colony are incompatible with the lofty ideas of granting the soil and all its inhabitants from sea to sea.

They demonstrate the truth that these grants asserted a title against Europeans only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned. The power of war is given only for defence, not for conquest. The charters contain passages showing one of their objects to be the civilization of the Indians, and their conversion to Christianity -- objects to be accomplished by conciliatory conduct and good example, not by extermination.

The actual state of things and the practice of European nations on so much of the American continent as lies between the Mississippi and the Atlantic, explain their claims and the charters they granted. Their pretensions unavoidably interfered with each other; though the discovery of one was admitted by all to exclude the claim of any other, the extent of that discovery was the subject of unceasing contest.

Bloody conflicts arose between them which gave importance and security to the neighbouring nations. Fierce and warlike in their character, they might be formidable enemies or effective friends. Instead of rousing their resentments by asserting claims to their lands or to dominion over their persons, their alliance was sought by flattering professions, and purchased by rich presents. The English, the French, and the Spaniards were equally competitors for their friendship and their aid.

Not well acquainted with the exact meaning of. Certain it is that our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our country, of any attempt on the part of the Crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances.

The King purchased their when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take, but never coerced a surrender of them.

The general views of Great Britain with regard to the Indians were detailed by Mr Stuart, Superintendent of Indian affairs, in a speech delivered at Mobile, in presence of several persons of distinction, soon after the peace of Towards the conclusion, he says,. But, whenever you shall be pleased to surrender any of your territories to his majesty, it must be done, for the future, at a public meeting of your nation, when the governors of the provinces or the superintendent shall be present, and obtain the consent of all your people.

The boundaries of your hunting grounds will be accurately fixed, and no settlement permitted to be made upon them. As you may be assured that all treaties. The proclamation issued by the King of Great Britain in , soon after the ratification of the articles of peace, forbids the Governors of any of the colonies to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents upon any lands whatever which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us the King , as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.

Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting the territory from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, and such her practical exposition of the charters she had granted. She considered them as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves, under her protection; and she.

This was the settled state of things when the war of our revolution commenced. The influence of our enemy was established; her resources enabled her to keep up that influence; and the colonists had much cause for the apprehension that the Indian nations would, as the allies of Great Britain, add their arms to hers.

This, as was to be expected, became an object of great solicitude to Congress. Far from advancing a claim to their lands, or asserting any right of dominion over them, Congress resolved "that the securing and preserving the friendship of the Indian nations appears to be a subject of the utmost moment to these colonies. The early journals of Congress exhibit the most anxious desire to conciliate the Indian nations. Three Indian departments were established; and commissioners appointed in each.

The most strenuous exertions were made to procure those supplies on which Indian friendships were supposed to depend, and every thing which might excite hostility was avoided. The language of equality in which it is drawn evinces the temper with which the negotiation was undertaken and the opinion which then prevailed in the United States.

That all offences or acts of hostilities by one or either of the contracting parties against the other be mutually forgiven, and buried in the depth of oblivion, never more to be had in remembrance. That a perpetual peace and friendship shall, from henceforth, take place and subsist between the contracting parties aforesaid, through all succeeding generations, and if either of the parties are engaged in a just and necessary war with any other nation or nations.

For the better security of the peace and friendship now entered into by the contracting parties against all infractions of the same by the citizens of either party to the prejudice of the other, neither party shall proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of the other otherwise than by securing the offender or offenders, by imprisonment, or any other competent means, till a fair and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of both parties, as near as can be to the laws, customs and usages of the contracting parties, and natural justice,".

The fifth article regulates the trade between the contracting parties in a manner entirely equal. The sixth article is entitled to peculiar attention, as it contains a disclaimer of designs which were, at that time, ascribed to the United States by their enemies, and from the imputation of which Congress was then peculiarly anxious to free the government. It is in these words:.

The parties further agree that other tribes, friendly to the interest of the United States, may be invited to form a State, whereof the Delaware nation shall be the heads, and have a representation in Congress. This treaty, in its language, and in its provisions, is formed, as near as may be, on the model of treaties between the Crowned heads of Europe. The sixth article shows how Congress then treated the injurious calumny of cherishing designs unfriendly to the political and civil rights of the Indians.

During the War of the Revolution, the Cherokees took part with the British. After its termination, the United States, though desirous of peace, did not feel its necessity so strongly as while the war continued.

Their political situation being changed, they might very well think it advisable to assume a higher tone, and to impress on the Cherokees the same respect for Congress which was before felt for the King of Great Britain. This may account for the language of the treaty of Hopewell. There is the more reason for supposing that the Cherokee chiefs were not very critical judges of the language, from the fact that every one makes his mark; no chief was capable of signing his name.

It is probable the treaty was interpreted to them. When the United States gave peace, did they not also receive it? Were not both parties desirous of it? If we consult the history of the day, does it not inform us that the United States were at least as anxious to obtain it as the Cherokees? We may ask, further: did the Cherokees come to the seat of the American government to solicit peace, or did the American commissioners go to them to obtain it?

The treaty was made at Hopewell, not at New York. The word "give," then, has no real importance attached to it. The first and second articles stipulate for the mutual restoration of prisoners, and are of course equal. The third article acknowledges the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other power.

This stipulation is found in Indian treaties, generally. The general law of European sovereigns respecting their claims in America limited the intercourse of Indians, in a. Goods, indispensable to their comfort, in the shape of presents were received from the same hand.

What was of still more importance, the strong hand of government was interposed to restrain the disorderly and licentious from intrusions into their country, from encroachments on their lands, and from those acts of violence which were often attended by reciprocal murder.

It involved, practically, no claim to their lands, no dominion over their persons. It merely bound the nation to the British Crown as a dependent ally claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbour and receiving the advantages of that protection without involving a surrender of their national character.

Neither the British government nor the Cherokees ever understood it otherwise. The same stipulation entered into with the United States is undoubtedly to be construed in the same manner.

They receive the Cherokee Nation into their favor and protection. The manner in which this stipulation was understood by the American government is explained by the language and acts of our first President.

The fourth article draws the boundary between the Indians and the citizens of the United States. But, in describing this boundary, the term "allotted" and the term "hunting ground" are used. Is it reasonable to suppose that the Indians, who could not write and most probably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language, should distinguish the word "allotted" from the words "marked out.

When, in fact, they were ceding lands to the United States, and describing the extent of their cession, it may very well be supposed that they might not understand the term employed as indicating that, instead of granting, they were receiving lands. If the term would admit of no other signification, which is not conceded, its being misunderstood is so apparent, results so necessarily from the whole transaction, that it must, we think, be taken in the sense in which it was most obviously used.

To the United States, it could be a matter of no concern whether their whole territory was devoted to hunting grounds or whether an occasional village and an occasional corn field, interrupted, and gave some variety to the scene.